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THE PROSPECT OF ANTITRUST LAW AND 
POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
IN REFERENCE TO THE JAPANESE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW AND JAPAN  
FAIR TRADE COMMISSION 
TOSHIAKI TAKIGAWA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The harmonization of competition law and policy has emerged recently as 
an important topic in international trade. This increasing interest stems from 
a generally accelerated worldwide liberalization of trade. With the recession 
of governmental trade barriers, private anticompetitive conduct has surfaced 
as a major trade barrier. 
The importance of competition law and policy transcends international 
trade. Domestic and international competition significantly affect the 
economic performance of all countries, and thus competition policy should 
not be considered merely from the perspective of trade policy. Most major 
countries and regions have developed their own competition policies for their 
individual economic welfare rather than to safeguard trade. At present, the 
global harmonization of competition law is feasible only in the general 
prohibition against naked cartels.1 Other competition law fields (including 
regulations against collaboration, exclusionary practices, vertical restraints, 
and mergers) have evolved constantly. Furthermore, as the importance of 
innovation has increased dramatically, many competition authorities now are 
seeing the need to develop policies directed toward research and 
development activities. Moreover, many countries also have engaged in 
deregulation and regulatory reform. Competition authorities therefore must 
define their roles in regulatory reform and coordinate competition law 
enforcement with sector-specific regulations. The world cannot harmonize 
such diverse areas of competition law and policy instantly. What we need 
today is not forced harmonization but rather a frank attitude to learn from 
other countries’ experiences. 
In this Article, I examine Japanese competition law and policy with a 
  Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan. 
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 1. For information on competition harmonization at the World Trade Organization (WTO), see 
generally TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES: KEY ISSUES AND COMMENTS ON THE WTO REPORT 
(1998) ON TRADE AND COMPETITION (Roger Zach ed., 1999). 
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view toward increasing its effectiveness in establishing a pro-competitive 
Japanese economy. Japan’s competition policy has profound international 
importance, as Japan possesses the third largest economy in the world 
(behind the United States and European Union). Moreover, Japan is unique 
in that its competition policy has enjoyed an upsurge in popularity recently, 
displacing the long-lasting supremacy of Japan’s industrial policy. Analyzing 
current Japanese competition law and policy will shed light on the future 
course of competition policy worldwide. The Japanese experience holds 
particular relevance for those countries that recently have emerged from 
government-orchestrated development and are in the process of developing 
competition-oriented economies. 
II. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY  
IN JAPAN 
Japan enacted its competition law, the Antimonopoly Law of 1947,2 after 
its defeat in World War II, using U.S. antitrust law as a model. At the same 
time, Japan inaugurated the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) as the 
agency in charge of enforcing the Antimonopoly Law. After the end of the 
Allied Occupation, the Japanese Parliament revised the Antimonopoly Law 
twice (in 1949 and 1953), adding new clauses to differentiate it from U.S. 
law.3 
While active initially, JFTCs enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 
deteriorated under the shadow of the industrial policy promulgated by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). However, beginning in 
the mid-1970s, the Antimonopoly Law began to show signs of life, and in 
1977, Japan strengthened it with new provisions (primarily as a measure to 
combat the increased inflation caused by the oil crisis in the Middle East). Of 
particular importance was the introduction of a surcharge against illegal 
cartels. Adoption of the surcharge played a crucial role in making the JFTC’s 
prohibition of cartels truly effective. Before 1977, the JFTC could not 
sanction condemned cartels. However, external pressure (primarily from the 
United States) influenced Japan to strengthen both the Antimonopoly Law 
and the JFTC. Most significant was the Structural Impediments Initiative 
 2. Act Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 
54 of 1947 [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law], reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). 
 3. For details on the history of the Antimonopoly Law, see JOHN O. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN 
GERMANY AND JAPAN (2001); Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, in GLOBAL 
COMPETITION POLICY 151 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 1997); IYORI & UESUGI, 
supra note 2, at 1-66. 
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(SII) negotiations between the United States and Japan to rectify the chronic 
trade imbalance between the two countries.4 Under the framework of the SII, 
Japan significantly strengthened criminal sanctions for violations of the 
Antimonopoly Law and increased the number of JFTC personnel. 
Table 1. Amounts of Surcharges5 
Fiscal 
Year 
Number 
of cases 
Companies 
involved 
Total amount of surcharges 
(ten thousand yen) 
1989 6 54 80,349 
1990 11 175 1,256,214 
1991 10 101 197,169 
1992 17 135 268,157 
1993 21 406 355,321 
1994 26 512 566,829 
1995 24 741 644,640 
1996 14 368 748,616 
1997 16 369 283,289 
1998 16 576 314,915 
1999 20 335 545,891 
2000 16 719 851,668 
 
Currently, the Japanese government and business community generally 
recognize the importance of competition law and policy. When Japan 
renamed the MITI the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 
2000, it established a department solely responsible for competition policy. 
The more than decade-long economic slump following the collapse of the 
bubble economy in 1989 induced these attitudinal changes. Japanese 
businesses and the government both realized that the structural weakness in 
Japan’s economy lies in the industrial sectors secluded from competition 
(most notably the financial, construction, retail, and electricity sectors). In 
this regard, Michael Porter observed in an influential book: “Few roles of 
government are more important to the upgrading of an economy than 
ensuring vigorous domestic rivalry.”6 Japan’s government and a large portion 
of its business community finally have come to share this view. To increase 
competition, the strengthening of competition policy (primarily active 
 
 
 4. For details on the SII, see IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 2, at 62-64. 
 5. Kosei Torihiki Iinkai [Fair Trade Commission], Kosei Torihiki Iinkai Nenji Hokoku 
Dokusenkinshi-ho Hakusho (Heisei 13 Nenpo) [Fair Trade Commission Annual Report] 118 (2001). 
 
 6. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 662 (1990). 
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enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law combined with deregulation and 
regulatory reform in regulated sectors) is imperative. 
The JFTC now faces a favorable environment for implementing 
competition policy. However, now that competition policy has become a 
major issue, the JFTC must compete with other governmental agencies 
(including METI and the Telecommunications Bureau of the Ministry of 
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) to 
administer it. Therefore, the JFTC must upgrade the competence of its 
personnel and enforce the Antimonopoly Law more actively. Now that the 
Japanese political environment recognizes the importance of competition 
policy, the JFTC cannot defend its inactivity based on the lack of a political 
consensus. Furthermore, the JFTC must clarify what role it is going to play in 
deregulation and regulatory reform. In the ensuing sections, I examine the 
areas in which the JFTC could improve its competition policy and 
enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law. Focusing on the Japanese 
experience, I hope to elicit general lessons for twenty-first century antitrust. 
III. THE NEED TO CLARIFY STANDARDS FOR COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES 
In today’s economy, companies engage in various local and international 
alliances. Included within these alliances are efficient collaborations that 
should not be condemned as cartels. However, the question remains: How 
can a competition authority distinguish beneficial collaborations from 
anticompetitive cartels? 
A. The International Relevance of the Dichotomy Between “Per Se” 
Illegality and the “Rule of Reason” 
U.S. antitrust laws answer this question by distinguishing between 
collaborations (or horizontal agreements) deemed to be “per se” illegal, and 
those analyzed by the “rule of reason.” Collaborations whose sole objective 
is to restrain competition are condemned as per se illegal, while the rule of 
reason controls examination of all other collaborations. Currently, the rule of 
reason analysis includes considerations of efficiency and market power.7 
Other countries may adopt the U.S. approach of distinguishing between 
per se illegality and the rule of reason, as this demarcation appears to be the 
most sensible approach toward classifying collaborations. Nevertheless, one 
 7. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 1.2 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ 
ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES]. 
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may criticize the current rule of reason analysis as being too complicated, as 
balancing considerations of market power and efficiency requires a detailed 
economic analysis. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department 
of Justice (DOJ) issued explanatory guidelines in 2000 to clarify the rule of 
reason approach as applied to collaborations.8 However, the guidelines do 
not delineate clearly between illegal and legal collaborations, and appear 
more like a legal treatise than actual guidelines. Nevertheless, a detailed 
economic analysis for collaborations other than blatantly naked cartels 
should be utilized. The guidelines issued by the FTC and DOJ represent the 
best effort at a step-by-step explanation of the rule of reason. 
The European Union takes a different approach. The European 
Commission treats virtually all collaborations as automatic infringements of 
Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,9 and then 
proceeds with exemption scrutiny under Article 81(3). This approach places 
too much weight on the exemption stage where the Commission incorporates 
industry policy-type considerations. Scholars have proposed to shift the 
Commission’s Article 81 analysis toward the rule of reason approach. In 
addition, the Commission recently has been trying to incorporate a more 
economic approach into its assessment of horizontal agreements. In January 
2001, the Commission published the Guidelines on the Applicability of 
Article 81 to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements10—a shift in focus that 
may be interpreted as an introduction of the rule of reason analysis into the 
application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
B. The Problem with the Antimonopoly Law’s “Substantial Restraint of 
Competition” Standard 
The Antimonopoly Law stipulates that collaborations are illegal when 
they form a “substantial restraint of competition.”11 This terminology mirrors 
 8. See generally id. 
 9. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997). 
 10. Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 
O.J. (C 3) 2. See also Mark Griffiths & Sabina Nüesch, Modernizing the Treatment of Horizontal 
Agreements—An Analysis of the Commission’s Proposals, 21 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 452, 458-61 
(2000). 
 11. Section 2(6) of the Antimonopoly Law defines unreasonable restraints of trade as any 
business activities  
by which any entrepreneur, by contract, agreement or any other concerted actions . . . with other 
entrepreneurs, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner as to fix, 
maintain, or increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities, or customers or 
suppliers, thereby causing . . . a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of 
trade.” 
Antimonopoly Law § 2(6) (emphasis added). 
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that used for mergers12 and monopolization.13 “Substantial restraint of 
competition,” through an accumulation of cases, has come to refer to the 
formation of market power. 
From the standpoint of current knowledge, this standard for 
collaborations seems illogical, as the Antimonopoly Law requires the JFTC 
to prove the formation of market power before declaring any collaboration 
illegal. Market power analysis requires detailed economic scrutiny, which 
sacrifices the JFTC’s resources and causes an insufficient condemnation of 
naked cartels. 
This is one example where the detailed and inflexible phrases of the 
Antimonopoly Law, enacted over fifty-five years ago, have obstructed the 
rational development of legal reasoning. The simple and abstract wording of 
Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 lends itself more to the cumulative 
improvement of legal standards. Now that the political and business 
environments generally favor competition policy, the JFTC should proceed 
with an overall revision of the Antimonopoly Law in order to rationalize its 
governance. 
With regard to clearly anticompetitive cartels, the JFTC has come to 
adopt a “per se illegal” approach, thus truncating the market power analysis 
for naked cartels. Moreover, for distribution-related conduct, the JFTC 
published the Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business 
Practices in 1991 in response to trade conflicts with the United States.14 In 
these guidelines, the JFTC stated that pernicious collaborations such as price 
cartels and bid rigging arrangements are “illegal in principle.”15 The JFTC 
should explicitly adopt the “illegal in principle” standard for all naked cartels. 
To illustrate this point clearly, the JFTC should abolish Section 2(6) of the 
Antimonopoly Law. 
With regard to collaborations that are not clearly anticompetitive, the 
JFTC has not yet adopted a rule of reason analysis comparable to that of the 
United States. Instead, the JFTC has followed Section 2(6)’s standard 
concerning a “substantial restraint of competition.”16 Under this standard, the 
JFTC does not condemn collaborations that are not clearly anticompetitive as 
 12. “No company in Japan shall effect a merger…[w]here the effect…may be substantially to 
restrain competition in any particular field of trade.” Id. § 15 (emphasis added). 
 13. “No entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization or an unreasonable restraint of fair 
trade.” Id. § 3. 
 14. Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business 
Practices (July 11, 1991), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/guideli/distributionGL.pdf 
[hereinafter Distribution Guidelines]. 
 15. Id. at 2. 
 16. See supra note 11. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/13
p275 Takigawa1 book pages.doc  10/15/02   11:33 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] THE PROSPECT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN JAPAN 281 
 
 
 
 
 
being illegal until they are found to form market power. This seems too 
simplified an approach, as the JFTC does not balance considerations of 
efficiency and competition restraint. Inefficient collaborations should be 
illegal even if their level of market power is ambiguous. At the same time, 
the JFTC should tolerate highly efficient collaborations even when they 
temporarily form market power. Such a sophisticated balancing approach is 
most appropriate in innovation and technology related markets.17 
C. The Increasing Irrelevance of Special Treatment for Trade 
Associations 
The Antimonopoly Law contains a special provision regarding “trade 
associations.” Section 8 details what constitutes illegal conduct by trade 
associations. In addition, to supplement Section 8, the JFTC published the 
Guidelines Concerning the Activities of Trade Associations18 and issued 
comfort letters to predict interpretation. The JFTC devotes considerably 
greater resources to regulate the conduct of trade associations relative to most 
other countries. 
The primary benefit of Section 8 is that it prohibits certain practices by 
trade associations even when they do not constitute a “substantial restraint of 
competition.” This special provision for trade associations possesses 
historical relevance, as Japanese trade associations traditionally have played 
a central role in anticompetitive business conduct. However, this special 
treatment for trade associations also produces inconsistent standards among 
diverse forms of collaborations and joint ventures. Section 2(1) of the 
Antimonopoly Law stipulates certain conditions for associations to be treated 
as “trade associations” for the purposes of Section 8. Other associations, 
consortia, joint ventures, or collaborations fall outside Section 8’s ambit. In 
today’s economy, particularly in technology markets, companies create 
diverse forms of associations and collaborations. To achieve consistent and 
equal treatment for all collaborations, the JFTC should repeal Section 8 and 
simultaneously rationalize the general standard of illegality for collaborations 
in the aforementioned ways. 
 17. See infra Part VII. 
 18. Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines Concerning the Activities of Trade Associations 
(1995), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/dokusen/3/tagl/index.htm. 
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D. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
Demarcation of “per se” illegality and the rule of reason doctrine may be 
adopted worldwide. Each country should modify its standard according to its 
individual legal system. In Japan, the JFTC has modified per se illegality to 
become the “illegal in principle” standard. The countries in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) already nearly share a 
consensus for treating naked cartels as per se illegal—a consensus that may 
extend to member countries of the WTO at the next Round. 
Governments should evaluate business collaborations that are not clearly 
anticompetitive through a balanced consideration of efficiency and 
competition restraint. To achieve this, competition authorities should utilize a 
specific economic analysis. Thus far, the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors represents the best effort at 
systematically conducting a balancing analysis.19 It would benefit other 
countries’ competition authorities to study the U.S. guidelines closely when 
developing their own guidelines. 
Governments should draft competition statutes using general and flexible 
language to enable competition authorities and courts to adapt and improve 
legal standards if necessary. The overly detailed and outmoded phrases of 
Japan’s Antimonopoly Law hinder the amelioration of JFTC and judicial 
application. Competition authorities and parliaments should not hesitate to 
revise competition laws when the language within becomes outdated. 
IV. THE NEED TO CLARIFY STANDARDS FOR VERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS 
A. Vertical Arrangements As Trade Barriers 
Foreign manufacturers and trade officials (particularly those in the United 
States and European Union) have criticized Japanese manufacturers for their 
exclusionary arrangements with retailers, wholesalers, and parts 
manufacturers. Foreign officials called these arrangements keiretsu, as if they 
were exclusively Japanese phenomena. However, companies worldwide use 
such arrangements, which collectively should be generalized as vertical 
arrangements. 
The JFTC applies the Antimonopoly Law impartially to foreign and 
domestic companies with regard to their vertical arrangements, a point 
sustained by a WTO panel in the Kodak-Fuji case.20 The panel noted that 
 19. See generally COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 7. 
 20. See Report of the Panel, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
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Japan applied its laws and rules impartially to foreign and domestic 
companies, thereby fulfilling its “National Treatment” obligation under 
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).21 At the 
same time, the panel rejected application of the WTO’s non-violation 
nullification clause22 to importing nations’ provisions that apply equally to 
foreign and domestic companies. The panel decision is noteworthy in 
indicating that business practices forming market barriers do not necessarily 
deserve instant condemnation. Many business practices with exclusionary 
effects possess legitimate business reasons. Thus, competition authorities 
rather than trade officials should analyze these practices using a rule of 
reason analysis. 
Competition laws in major countries generally have failed to establish 
clear standards toward vertical arrangements. Their standards are still in the 
evolutionary stage. Nonetheless, the Antimonopoly Law standards toward 
vertical arrangements remain murkier than those of the United States and 
European Union. This lack of clarity emanates from the all-embracing 
phrasing of the Antimonopoly Law’s “unfair trade practices” clause,23 the 
coverage of which extends beyond vertical arrangements. The JFTC should 
clarify standards for “unfair trade practices” to rationalize enforcement of the 
Antimonopoly Law rather than based on trade considerations. 
B. “Unfair Trade Practices” vs. “Unfair Methods of Competition” 
An important characteristic of the JFTC’s enforcement of the 
Antimonopoly Law is its frequent use of the “unfair trade practices” clause. 
The phrase “unfair trade practices” originates from the language of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.24 In the United States, the judicially 
established supremacy of the Sherman Act has made it difficult to condemn 
purportedly unfair business practices under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act if the practices do not violate the Sherman Act. This development 
harmonized U.S. antitrust law, as demarcation of business practices by their 
anticompetitive characteristics became clearer. Namely, Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act deals with collaborative conduct while Section 2 deals with 
unitary exclusionary conduct, although some inconsistency still remains. In 
contrast, the Antimonopoly Law contains clauses that do not possess such a 
Paper, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Panel]. 
 21. See id. Part. X.F. See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. III, 61 
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 22. Report of the Panel, supra note 20, Part X.E. See also GATT art. XXIII ¶ 1(b). 
 23. See Antimonopoly Law § 2(9). 
 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). 
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clear demarcation of roles, which has caused incoherent and inconsistent 
application. 
C. Overlapping Application to Unitary Exclusionary Conduct 
The Antimonopoly Law defines an “unfair trade practice” as “any act . . . 
which tends to impede fair competition and which is designated by the Fair 
Trade Commission . . .”25 Unfair trade practices transcend the boundaries of 
collaborative, unitary, or vertical arrangements. As to horizontal 
collaborations, the JFTC customarily applies either Section 326 or Section 8 
of the Antimonopoly Law, although it still condemns group boycott conduct 
both as an “undue restraint of trade” and as an unfair trade practice. 
The prohibitions against unfair trade practices present two major 
problems: (1) the duplication of Section 3’s prohibition of private 
monopolization, and (2) the vague standard within regarding vertical 
arrangements. When deciding monopolization cases, the JFTC can apply 
either Section 3 or one of the clauses prohibiting unfair trade practices.27 By 
using the all-embracing definition in Section 2(9), the JFTC uses the unfair 
trade practices clauses to find illegality in a diverse array of conduct. 
Recently, the JFTC has begun using Section 3’s monopolization clause to 
enforce illegal conduct, but this has been only infrequently. 
Applying the clauses prohibiting unfair trade practices to unitary 
exclusionary conduct entails a danger of finding illegality in an overly broad 
range of conduct. This danger is most marked in pricing conduct. The JFTC 
has not regulated unitary pricing conduct as a monopolization or as predatory 
pricing, but rather as unduly low or differentiated prices through Section 
2(9). The Antimonopoly Law does not require the JFTC to find actual market 
power before condemning companies’ conduct. As to unduly low prices, the 
JFTC published the Guidelines Concerning Unfair Price Cutting in 1984, 
explaining that consistent sales at a “price which is excessively below cost” 
and other unduly low prices violate the Antimonopoly Law when they harm 
other entities’ business.28 This definition is too broad for two reasons. First, it 
enables the JFTC to prosecute those who price above their average variable 
cost. Second, it may enable the JFTC to find firms without market power 
guilty of violating the Antimonopoly Law. In addition, the JFTC may find 
 25. Antimonopoly Law § 2(9). 
 26. See supra note 13. 
 27. See, e.g., Antimonopoly Law §§ 2(9), 19-20. 
 28. See Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines Concerning Unfair Price Cutting (Nov. 20, 1984), 
available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/guideli/pricecut.html. 
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low prices to be illegal as unduly differentiated prices even when they fail to 
constitute unduly low prices. Recently, politicians receiving requests from 
liquor retailers have been pressuring the JFTC to prosecute low prices as 
unfair trade practices. This seems to indicate that the vague definition of 
unfair trade practices in the Antimonopoly Law creates an expectation 
among retailers that the JFTC will protect and rescue them. However, the 
JFTC would be better off applying Section 3’s monopolization clause to 
unitary pricing conduct rather than prosecuting it as an unfair trade practice. 
D. Ambiguity and Inflexibility in the Regulation of Vertical Arrangements 
If one excludes horizontal collaborations and unitary exclusionary 
conduct from the domain of unfair trade practices, the role of unfair trade 
practices will rest solely on regulating vertical arrangements. This would 
result in more logical applications of the Antimonopoly Law. Nonetheless, 
the JFTC still should establish a clearer standard regarding the illegality of 
vertical arrangements. 
The JFTC’s Designation of Unfair Trade Practices classifies unfair trade 
practices into sixteen different categories, such as refusals to deal, tie-in 
sales, resale price maintenance, and trade restraining conditions.29 Although 
minutely classified, the JFTC cannot find any conduct illegal unless it deems 
the conduct to be “undue” or lacking legitimate business reasons. Therefore, 
the JFTC’s Designation adds little explanatory power to Sections 2(9) and 19 
of the Antimonopoly Law. 
Due to the vague provisions regarding unfair trade practices, the JFTC 
can find illegality in a vast array of business conduct. However, the JFTC 
still fails to actively apply the Antimonopoly Law to vertical arrangements. 
Resale price maintenance has dominated JFTC enforcement of the 
prohibition of unfair trade practices, which the JFTC treats as being “illegal 
in principle.” The overly broad provisions on unfair trade practices have 
hindered rather than helped the JFTC to actively enforce the Antimonopoly 
Law against vertical arrangements. 
The United States has never been completely satisfied with Japan’s 
enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law. The most prominent example 
concerns the Structural Impediments Initiative negotiations from 1989 to 
1990, during which the United States demanded more active enforcement 
against restrictive conduct committed by Japanese firms. In response to this 
pressure, the JFTC published the Guidelines Concerning Distribution 
 
 29. See Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Designation of Unfair Trade Practices (June 18, 1982), 
available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/acts/gd.htm. 
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Systems and Business Practices.30 The Guidelines considerably improved 
standards regarding vertical restraints, particularly by limiting application of 
the prohibition of unfair trade practices to firms that are “influential in the 
market” for distribution-related conduct, excepting only resale price 
maintenance. This is similar to the market power standard, but is more broad 
and vague, as the Guidelines consider a firm to be influential if it either is 
within the top three entities in the relevant market or has more than 10% of 
the relevant market share.31 
The JFTC should continue to delimit and clarify application of the 
provisions prohibiting unfair trade practices. First, it should adopt a market 
power standard rather than the standard set out in the Guidelines Concerning 
Distribution Systems and Business Practices in order to regulate vertical 
restraints in a more economically meaningful manner (and yet retain the per 
se prohibition against resale price maintenance). Second, the JFTC should 
publish general guidelines for vertical restraints. It is logically inconsistent to 
have guidelines that only target distribution-related conduct. The JFTC 
should use the same standard to regulate both production-related and 
distribution-related conduct. 
E. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
Vertical arrangements often have been considered to be trade issues. 
However, they should not be considered exclusively from the perspective of 
trade barriers, and should be scrutinized by competition authorities rather 
than trade officials. 
Competition law standards toward vertical arrangements are universally 
in the evolutionary stage. No clear standards exist. Nonetheless, competition 
authorities should endeavor to create standards that are as clear and 
economically meaningful as possible. To achieve this objective, they should 
avoid ambiguous and all-embracing phrases such as “unfair” or 
“unreasonable” in their directive guidelines. In addition, competition 
authorities should adopt a market power requirement for delimiting illegality 
in vertical arrangements (excepting only resale price maintenance). 
 30. See Distribution Guidelines, supra note 14. 
 31. Id. ch. 4.2. 
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V. THE INCREASING REFINEMENT OF MERGER CONTROLS 
A. The Need for Clear and Flexible Merger Guidelines 
The opening of WTO member countries’ economies to global 
competition has pressed companies to restructure their businesses to enhance 
efficiency, which, in turn, has brought a worldwide increase in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
The field of mergers and acquisitions, in particular, calls for 
administrative competition law guidelines. As mergers are difficult to 
unscramble, companies need a guide as to what sorts of mergers the 
competition authority will find illegal. Thus, merger guidelines should 
provide a systematic explanation regarding anticompetitive mergers. At the 
same time, the guidelines should give the competition authority enough 
flexibility to judge mergers on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Improvements in the Japanese Merger Guidelines 
The JFTC revised its merger guidelines in December 1998.32 The 1998 
Merger Guidelines apply to both mergers and stock purchase acquisitions 
that lead to consolidation among firms. The old merger guidelines provided 
insufficient guidance as they only identified the types of mergers that the 
JFTC would select for “close examination” and did not explain what 
standard the JFTC employed to determine the illegality of mergers. The 
“25% market share,” listed as a numerical guidepost in selecting mergers for 
“close examination,” became the danger threshold for illegality. The JFTC 
itself seems to have taken such a standpoint. The 25% market share standard, 
however, should serve only as a starting point for merger examination. It 
should function as a safe harbor, below which companies may conduct 
mergers safely. 
During the 1990s, the JFTC gradually increased the sophistication of its 
merger analysis. For example, in a 1997 consultation case regarding a merger 
between Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals, Inc. and Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, 
Inc., the JFTC permitted a merger that resulted in a market share of 57% 
because it found that overseas producers exerted sufficient competitive 
pressure within the market. The 1998 Merger Guidelines essentially follow 
 32. See Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines for Interpretation on the Stipulation that “The 
Effect May Be Substantially to Restrain Competition in a Particular Field of Trade” Concerning 
M&As (Dec. 21, 1998), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/guideli/maGL.pdf [hereinafter 1998 
Merger Guidelines]. 
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the general approach of the U.S. merger guidelines (a fact the JFTC does not 
admit) and include, as a condition to finding a merger illegal, the formation 
of oligopolistic coordination in the industry as well as the unitary market 
power of a merging firm. For the first time, the JFTC advocated that market 
power (i.e. a “substantial restraint of competition”) is formed by oligopolistic 
coordination as well as by unitary conduct—a standard first established by 
the U.S. merger guidelines.33 
Similar to the U.S. merger guidelines, the JFTC’s 1998 Merger 
Guidelines show (1) a concentration ratio (70% by the top three firms in a 
market) above which the JFTC is likely to find market power, and (2) a safe 
harbor market share below 10% for a merged company. 
The JFTC’s decision to revise its merger guidelines to follow the U.S. 
merger guidelines in essence is sensible, as the U.S. guidelines, with their 
polished economic analysis, possess significant international relevance. 
Nonetheless, merger guidelines show only methods for delineating markets 
and finding market power. Competition authorities and courts should develop 
detailed standards through an accumulation of actual cases. 
C. The Need for Formal Merger Cases 
Since the last formal merger case in 1969 involving the merger of Yawata 
Iron & Steel Co. and Fuji Iron & Steel Co.,34 the JFTC has resolved all 
merger cases at the informal consultation stage prior to the mandatory merger 
filings. Companies have welcomed the informal procedure because they can 
obtain opinions from the JFTC confidentially. This system also benefits the 
JFTC, as informal consultation does not trigger mandatory time constraints. 
The informal procedure, however, possesses an obvious problem: a lack of 
transparency. Recognizing this criticism, the JFTC increased the 
transparency of consultation by publishing the essence of consultation cases 
online. Regardless, formal merger cases are needed, as consultation cases, 
even when published, only summarize the decisions and do not contain a 
detailed explanation of the underlying legal reasoning. Moreover, parties to 
consultation cases cannot appeal the decisions to the courts. To continuously 
clarify regulation standards, detailed legal analyses of actual cases should 
accompany the 1998 Merger Guidelines. Therefore, the JFTC occasionally 
must resolve important merger cases using a formal decision procedure. 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (Apr. 8, 
1997), available at http://www.usdoj. gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html. 
 34. Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, 16 SHINKETSUSHU 46 (Oct. 30, 1969). 
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D. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
Prohibiting (or conditionally approving) mergers that produce market 
power has become the common standard in the United States, European 
Union, and Japan. Market power should include that caused by oligopolistic 
coordination, as explicitly indicated by the 1998 Merger Guidelines. 
In order to assure companies of the legality of their mergers, merger 
guidelines should indicate numerical market share or concentration ratios to 
signify safe harbors as well as the formation of market power. However, 
competition authorities should not treat such ratios as creating automatic 
illegality. Instead, authorities should analyze elements of market power 
systematically, including foreign competition and ease of entry. The U.S. 
merger guidelines present the best example of an economically meaningful 
and step-by-step analysis of market delineation and market power. 
Competition authorities worldwide are advised to study the U.S. guidelines 
closely and incorporate its methods into their own guidelines. 
Competition authorities tend to handle mergers through an informal 
consultation procedure, which most companies seem to prefer. Regardless, it 
is only through an accumulation of formal merger cases that detailed legal 
reasoning will emerge. 
VI. CONTROL OF “GENERAL CONCENTRATION” 
A. “General Concentration” vs. Market Concentration  
The Japanese Antimonopoly Law contains provisions concerned with 
“general concentration,” which refers to the concentration of economic 
power in individual companies or groups across industries. Control of 
general concentration remains distinct from control of mergers and stock 
purchase acquisitions, which aims to prevent the formation of market power 
in individual markets. Control of general concentration does not require a 
finding of market power in any particular market. Japan and Korea remain 
the only countries in the world with such competition law provisions, and 
now that the Japanese economy is at the forefront of global competition, the 
time has come to reexamine the rationale for general concentration control. 
The Antimonopoly Law regulations regarding general concentration 
reside in three provisions: (1) the prohibition against certain holding 
companies;35 (2) the restriction on stockholding by financial companies;36 
 35. Antimonopoly Law § 9. 
 36. Id. § 11. 
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and (3) the restriction on the total amount of stockholding by large non-
financial companies.37 Historically, general concentration provisions have 
occupied an important place in the Antimonopoly Law. In particular, the 
prohibitions against stockholding by certain companies symbolized a central 
measure for democratizing the Japanese economy. This explanation was 
convincing until sometime after Japan’s defeat in World War II, when 
memories of the pre-war zaibatsu were still fresh in the minds of Japanese 
citizens. 
A more modern rationale for controlling general concentration is to 
prevent corporate groupings popularly known as keiretsu. After the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu, loose forms of corporate groupings gradually 
formed through cross-holdings led by main banks and trading houses. After a 
gradual loosening of prohibitions, the Japanese government reinvigorated 
general concentration control in 1977, lowering banks’ stockholding ceiling 
from 10% to 5% and adding a new stockholding ceiling for large non-
financial companies (most notably the large trading houses). Citizen hostility 
toward large corporate groups and trading houses that they believed profited 
from galloping inflation during the oil crisis in the 1970s fueled the revival of 
general concentration regulation. 
B. Increased Toleration of Holding Companies 
General concentration may affect democracy through large companies’ 
political influence. Moreover, corporate groups may affect competition in 
markets through conglomerate effects. However, these effects remain 
ambiguous and unproven. Therefore, when Japanese companies facing 
global competition in the 1990s demanded more freedom in corporate form, 
the government responded by mitigating the Antimonopoly Law provisions 
against general concentration. Then, in 1997, the government amended 
Section 9, replacing the general prohibition of pure holding companies with a 
prohibition limited to three types of holding companies. 
The 5% stockholding ceiling for banks in Section 11 survived the 1997 
revision of the Antimonopoly Law. Nevertheless, the JFTC proclaimed that 
holding companies fall outside the domain of Section 11. Therefore, bank 
holding companies are regulated only by the Banking Law and thus may 
hold stock up to a 15% ceiling. With the objective of eliminating this 
discrepancy between the Antimonopoly Law and Banking Law, proposals 
have suggested replacing Section 11 of the Antimonopoly Law with 
 37. Id. § 9-2. 
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language identical to the Banking Law. In addition, the Japan Federation of 
Economic Organizations, the Keidanren, proposed the elimination of Section 
9(2)’s restriction on stockholdings by large non-financial companies. The 
declining influence of large trading houses made the Keidanren’s proposal 
that much more convincing. On May 22, 2002, the Parliament passed the bill 
to repeal Section 9(2).38 
Even after the 1997 revision of the Antimonopoly Law, the rationale for 
controlling general concentration remains ambiguous. Section 9 states that 
holding companies that lead to an “excessive concentration of economic 
power” are prohibited.39 However, the Antimonopoly Law defines 
“economic power” vaguely and without any convincing logical connection. 
In addition, Section 9 lists three types of prohibited holding companies, each 
of which it delineates using numerical standards. 
C. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
The control of general concentration is rational when giant corporate 
groups such as Japan’s pre-war zaibatsu or postwar keiretsu control national 
economies. However, overly strict regulation of general concentration 
possesses demerit in the narrowing of the freedom of corporate 
organizations. As increases in competition weaken the power of large 
corporate groups, competition authorities should loosen control over general 
concentration for the sake of giving corporations organizational freedom. 
In contrast with the market power standard for merger control, the control 
over general concentration lacks an economically meaningful standard. This 
led to inflexible numerical ceilings for prohibiting certain corporate forms or 
levels of stockholding but without any logical explanation as to how the 
government arrived at such thresholds. Inflexible ceilings obstruct the 
flexible interpretation necessary to parallel changing economic conditions. 
The increasing diversification of corporate forms and alliances together with 
the changing relationships between banks and commerce necessitate 
governmental reconsideration of the rationale for controlling general 
concentration. Such control may prove useful at certain stages of economic 
development, but its rationale should be evaluated constantly and its 
regulations should remain flexible. 
 38. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Approval of the Amendment of the 
Antimonopoly Law by the Diet (May 22, 2002), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/press/ 
index.html. 
 39. Antimonopoly Law § 9. 
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VII. INNOVATION AND COMPETITION LAW 
It is nearly unanimous among economists that upgrading national 
economies requires dynamic efficiency (efficiency through innovation or 
improvements in technology) more than static efficiency.40 
A. Guidelines for Collaborative Research and Development 
Generally, companies do not collaborate in research and development to 
restrict competition. Therefore, competition authorities should balance 
competition restraint and efficiency effects using a rule of reason analysis. In 
addition, the general antitrust rules regarding collaborative activities should 
incorporate characteristics of technology-related collaborations. 
For collaborative research and development, the JFTC published the 
Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and Development in 1993.41 The 
guidelines point out that collaborative research and development often 
increases efficiency, and thus is pro-competitive. The expectation is that the 
JFTC’s viewpoint eventually will lead to the use of a rule of reason analysis 
in which the efficiency and anticompetitive effects are balanced. However, 
the guidelines only list elements such as market share and the nature of 
research for determining a “substantial restraint of competition” and do not 
indicate that efficiency effects are taken into account. In practice, the JFTC 
may take efficiency into account, as it has never found a joint research and 
development collaboration to be illegal. Nevertheless, the JFTC should 
explicitly adopt a rule of reason analysis to clarify efficiency consideration. 
B. Guidelines for Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law 
In the areas of innovation and research and development, the most 
important task for competition authorities today is to clarify the relationship 
between intellectual property rights and competition law. Most business 
activities in the technology sector involve intellectual property rights, most 
notably patent rights and copyrights. The importance of intellectual property 
rights increases as the role of technology in the economy increases. 
Monopolies authorized according to intellectual property rights are legal 
monopolies, and yet competition laws still apply to the abuse of intellectual 
 40. See PORTER, supra note 6, at 18-30; AKIRA GOTO & KOTARO SUZUMURA, COMPETITION 
POLICY IN JAPAN 4-5 (1999). 
 41. See generally Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning 
Joint Research and Development (Apr. 20, 1993). 
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property rights, including the extension of monopolization caused by 
misused licenses 
In 1995, the FTC and DOJ jointly issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property, which methodically explain the U.S. rule 
of reason analysis using case methods.42 These guidelines could serve as a 
model for other countries’ competition authorities, as the WTO’s Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights essentially 
homogenized the relationship between intellectual property rights and 
competition law worldwide. 
In 1999, the JFTC revised its Guidelines for Patent and Know-how 
Licensing Agreements.43 The revised guidelines represent a considerable 
improvement over the previous categorical classifications of legality as they 
adopt flexible standards for discerning illegality in licensing contracts. 
However, the JFTC could further improve the guidelines by considering two 
points. First, the JFTC should abolish the revised guidelines’ dogmatic view 
of treating certain types of licensing arrangements (including territorial 
divisions) as being legal “in principle.”44 Licensing contracts and 
arrangements are not purely exertions of intellectual property rights and thus 
competition law should control all of them. Second, the revised guidelines 
closely detail the standards regarding the “unfair trade practices” clauses in 
the Antimonopoly Law, but make only general statements regarding 
standards for collaborative activities.45 The JFTC would be wise to clarify the 
standards for intellectual property right-related collaborative activities by 
adopting a rule of reason analysis. 
C. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
Most collaboration in research and development is intended to increase 
efficiency, and thus a rule of reason analysis should apply. This represents an 
extension of general antitrust treatment for collaborations and, therefore, 
before composing special guidelines for collaborative research and 
development activities, competition authorities should establish general 
 42. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/guidelin.htm. 
 43. Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines for Patent and Know-how Licensing Agreements (July 
30, 1999), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/guideli/patent99.htm. 
 44. TOSHIAKI TAKIGAWA, HI-TECH SANGYO NO CHITEKIZAISANKEN TO DOKKINHO 
[INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION LAWS IN HI-TECHNOLOGY  INDUSTRIES] 73-
112 (2000). 
 45. Id. 
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guidelines for all collaborations. 
Intellectual property rights occupy a vital role in innovation, research, and 
development. Nevertheless, competition authorities should regulate the abuse 
of intellectual property rights. They should not exempt licensing contracts 
from competition law as belonging simply to the domain of intellectual 
property rights, and should analyze most of the licensing contracts using a 
rule of reason analysis. 
VIII. THE ELIMINATION OF EXEMPTED SECTORS 
The exemption of substantial parts of the Japanese economy from the 
application of competition laws limits the effectiveness of the competition 
laws. Therefore, exempted sectors should be eliminated. However, the 
elimination of the exempted sectors should not mean that all agreements 
concluded in those sectors should be considered illegal per se. Instead, the 
JFTC should apply a rule of reason analysis to determine their illegality. 
A. Curtailment of Exempted Sectors 
The language of the original 1947 Antimonopoly Law prohibited all 
cartels. The 1953 amendment subsequently exempted depression and 
rationalization cartels. More importantly, the MITI (and other ministries) 
enacted laws that exempted cartels located within their particular industries 
from the reach of the Antimonopoly Law, which significantly limited its 
effectiveness. The fact that ministries can shield their industries from 
competition using industry-specific exemptions has rendered the declaration 
of the Antimonopoly Law as the so-called “economic constitution” mere 
rhetoric. However, this phenomenon is not limited to Japan. Only in the 
European Union do competition laws restrain governments at all levels from 
enacting competition-restricting laws. 
To make its competition laws truly effective, Japan must establish a 
general policy for prioritizing competition over regulations. Competition 
policy in Japan has received a slowly increasing level of support at the 
highest levels of government. In addition, due to Japan’s membership in the 
IMF and GATT/WTO, the MITI and other ministries progressively have lost 
their legal apparatus for forcing and inducing companies into cartels. Since 
the mid-1990s, the number of exempted cartels has decreased, with their 
curtailment reaching a zenith in 1997. 
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B. Abolishing Exemptions for Depression and Rationalization Cartels 
In addition to the aforementioned curtailment of specific exemptions, 
there has been a reduction in stipulated exemptions under the Antimonopoly 
Law. The two most notable examples are the former exemptions for 
depression cartels46 and rationalization cartels.47 However, the elimination of 
these exemptions should not be interpreted as indicating that all such cartels 
are now per se illegal. Rather, if the cartels are pro-competitive in nature or 
increase efficiency, the JFTC should evaluate them using a rule of reason 
analysis. Depression cartels generally are inefficient by nature, and unless 
significant reasons exist to the contrary, they should be treated as illegal per 
se in order to eliminate as many inefficient enterprises as possible. Such 
agreements only tend to slow down industry adjustments. However, 
rationalization cartels should not necessarily receive the same per se 
treatment, as a relatively much larger portion of them possess legitimate 
efficiency-increasing objectives. 
C. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
Competition law exemptions should be eliminated. Moreover, 
competition laws and enforcement authorities should possess the power to 
restrain ministries and the Parliament from exempting specific sectors from 
application of the competition laws. In this respect, the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community can serve as a model for other countries to follow. 
On the other hand, the elimination of exemptions should not mean that all 
agreements in those sectors are subsequently illegal per se. Rather, 
competition authorities should apply a rule of reason analysis to those 
collaborations or agreements that serve to increase economic efficiency. 
IX. REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITION LAW 
A. Regulated Industries as a Cause of Structural Weakness 
The elimination of exempted sectors will not produce a competition-
oriented economy single-handedly. To achieve this it also is necessary for 
governments to deregulate industries or conduct regulatory reform in pro-
competitive fashion. The most competitive Japanese industries (most notably 
the consumer electronics and automotive industries) grew as a result of 
 46. Antimonopoly Law § 24(3) (repealed 1999). 
 47. Id. § 24(4) (repealed 1999). 
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intense domestic competition, and yet the Japanese government still 
continues to shield large parts of the Japanese economy from competition 
(including the financial, telecommunications, electric, airline, and 
construction industries).48 The existence of industries shielded from 
competition is one of the largest structural weaknesses in the Japanese 
economy, and it has contributed heavily to the decade-long economic 
slump.49 
Structural reforms and the introduction of competition are necessary to 
increase productivity in these protected sectors. This is something the 
Japanese government recognized, and has been trying to improve, since 
1980. Japan’s initial efforts were the result of consistent pressure by the 
United States to open up Japan’s markets. However, the pressing need to 
revitalize the Japanese economy has spurred the overwhelming majority of 
its increasingly productive efforts in recent years. 
Although it is not as advanced as the United States and United Kingdom, 
Japan has deregulated and reformed its economic regulations considerably, 
including large parts of the financial, telecommunications, and electric 
industries. While incumbent monopolists such as Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Corporation (NTT) have opposed regulatory reform, the business 
community in general has supported structural reform. The only question that 
persists concerns how rapidly the government can proceed under opposition 
from the incumbent monopolists and select bureaucrats. In addition, the 
government will have to deal with a seemingly increasing public antipathy 
toward deregulation and competition. The insistent tendency among Japanese 
scholars and journalists to place too much of an emphasis on a social “safety 
net” has contributed to protecting the interests of the status quo. 
B. The Role of the JFTC in Conducting Regulatory Reform 
The JFTC has remained relatively silent in the conduction of deregulation 
and regulatory reform, only establishing scholarly study groups to study 
regulated industries and subsequently publishing their reports. Although well 
researched, these reports have no binding legal authority, and ministries are 
free to follow or ignore them as they see fit. One example concerns the 
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and 
Telecommunications, which has ignored the JFTC’s reports on 
 48. According to a report by the JFTC in June 1995, regulated industries account for more than 
40% of Japan’s gross national product. Jun Ichiji, Seifu-Kisei Bunya No Weight Shisan [Weight 
Calculation of Regulated Sectors], KOSEI TORIHIKI [FAIR TRADE], Sept. 1995, at 48-49. 
 49. See MICHAEL PORTER ET AL., CAN JAPAN COMPETE? 32-35 (2000). 
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telecommunications reform completely. The OECD’s 1999 report on 
regulatory reform in Japan explicitly indicated that the insufficient presence 
of the JFTC represented a primary point of weakness in Japanese regulatory 
reform.50 It is crucial that the Japanese Parliament give the JFTC the formal 
capacity to engage in regulatory reform. 
With regard to its present role in regulatory reform, the JFTC should 
concentrate its efforts on enforcing the Antimonopoly Law against 
incumbent enterprises in regulated industries. The financial, 
telecommunications, and electricity sectors already have experienced 
substantial deregulation and are now eligible to receive strict Antimonopoly 
Law scrutiny. The elimination of the exemption clause in Section 21 of the 
Antimonopoly Law in 2000 made it clear that the Antimonopoly Law applies 
to inherently monopolized industries.51 
Despite the JFTC’s ability to enforce the Antimonopoly Law in the 
telecommunications, electric, and financial sectors, it rarely has done so 
because it previously has considered regulation in these sectors to belong 
exclusively to the individual sectoral ministries. However, the JFTC may be 
changing its attitude: in December 2000, it issued a warning to NTT East for 
a potential violation of the Antimonopoly Law regarding obstructive conduct 
toward new entrants in the Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) industry. 
C. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
Governments should give competition authorities formal status in 
governmental activities for regulatory reform. At the same time, competition 
authorities should not remain content with simply publishing study reports on 
regulated industries. They should devote a substantial portion of their human 
resources to enforcing competition laws in regulated industries like the 
telecommunications, electric, and financial sectors. The existence of 
regulatory ministries in each regulated industry should not inhibit 
competition authorities like the JFTC from enforcing competition laws. 
Competition authorities are more experienced and much better equipped to 
deal with the anticompetitive behavior of dominant incumbent businesses 
than industry ministries. 
 50. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REGULATORY 
REFORM IN JAPAN 109 (1999) (stating that increasing the visibility and impact of JFTC participation in 
policymaking is necessary to help reform succeed). 
 51. Former Section 21 stated that “[t]he provisions of this Act shall not apply to such acts . . . as 
are done in the proper course of business by a person engaging in [the] railway, electricity, gas, or any 
other business constituting a monopoly by the inherent nature of the said business.” 
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X. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 
A. Scarcity in Private Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 
Much of the strength of U.S. antitrust law rests on its private enforcement, 
which is comprised of (1) lawsuits to recover treble damages,52 and (2) 
lawsuits for injunctive relief against a potential or threatened loss or damage. 
In contrast, the JFTC has monopolized enforcement of the Antimonopoly 
Law in Japan. However, private enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 
would augment its efficacy significantly. The limited resources of the JFTC 
prevent it from enforcing the Antimonopoly Law as effectively and 
completely as possible. Citizens and businesses should be empowered to 
utilize the Antimonopoly Law by directly filing private causes of action. 
Moreover, the introduction of private enforcement would enable the JFTC to 
concentrate its resources on cases of the utmost interest to the public, leaving 
citizens and businesses to resolve private conflicts personally. 
Japanese citizens already are empowered to sue to recover damages under 
either the Antimonopoly Law53 or the Civil Law.54 However, there only have 
been a few private lawsuits to recover damages caused by violations of the 
Antimonopoly Law.55 Japanese courts’ stringent standards regarding 
causation and damages have minimized the likelihood of a successful 
recovery of damages. Nevertheless, in a 1993 civil suit, Tsuzuki, a 
manufacturer of elevator parts, successfully sued to recover damages from 
Toshiba, an elevator manufacturer, for monopolizing the market for 
maintenance of its own equipment.56 While not yet a clear trend, in the 
future, Japanese companies may utilize private causes of action more and 
more for damage recovery. 
B. Introduction of Injunctive Relief to the Antimonopoly Law 
For citizens, and businesses in particular, injunctive relief deals with 
violations of the Antimonopoly Law more directly than the recovery of 
damages. However, prior to 2000, the Antimonopoly Law did not enable 
private suits for injunctive relief. The JFTC was the only entity that could 
institute such a suit. However, the Japanese Parliament added Section 24 to 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1997). 
 53. Antimonopoly Law § 25. 
 54. MINPŌ art. 709. 
 55. Official statistics are unavailable due to the lack of an official reporting system for civil cases 
involving violations of the Antimonopoly Law. 
 56. Tsuzuki v. Toshiba Elevator, 1479 HANREI JIHŌ 21 (Osaka High Ct., July 30, 1993). 
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the Antimonopoly Law in 2000 specifically to allow private suits for 
injunctive relief by individuals and companies. Presently, with the exception 
of cartelization and monopolization cases, Section 24 only allows the 
institution of private suits to recover for “unfair trade practices.” However, 
over time, the scope of allowable injunctive relief is expected to be 
broadened significantly. 
C. Judicial Reform and Private Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 
Citizens and companies will not institute private suits for violations of the 
Antimonopoly Law if Japanese courts take years to resolve a single case. In 
addition, competent attorneys often are difficult to find. Determined to 
correct these longstanding problems, the Japanese government recently 
began reforming the judicial system. One measure suggested by a 
government-commissioned study group was a radical increase in the number 
of lawyers through reformation of the National Bar Examination and the 
institution of law schools moderately modeled after law schools in the United 
States.57 In time, the judicial reform will alter the Japanese judicial system to 
parallel those of the United States and the European Union, which likely will 
induce more private suits to enforce the Antimonopoly Law. 
D. Lessons for Twenty-First Century Antitrust 
The introduction of private enforcement (particularly private injunctive 
relief) will increase the effectiveness of competition law substantially. 
Allowing citizens and companies to directly file private lawsuits will free 
competition authorities to concentrate on cases of only the utmost public 
importance. To complement such a surge in private litigation, there must be a 
dramatic increase in the number of lawyers, and courts should increase their 
overall efficiency and effectiveness. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Most areas of competition law evolve constantly. Competition authorities 
worldwide should strive to continuously improve and update their particular 
country’s competition laws, which require learning from the practices, 
successes, and failures of other countries. Market economies function 
 
 57. See Shihô Seido Kaikaku Shingikai [Deliberation Council on Judicial System Reform], Shihô 
Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Ikensho [Report of the Deliberation Council on Judicial System Reform: 
Toward a Judicial System That Supports Japanese Society in the Twenty-First Century], June 12, 
2001, at 57. 
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similarly regardless of location, which means it is possible for the underlying 
principles and provisions of competition laws throughout the world to 
become more and more alike. However, while adopting ideas from other 
countries is important, such adoption should come through a gradual 
adaptation of the general principles of the adopted laws to the host country’s 
laws rather than through a forced harmonization. 
The JFTC has improved its enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law in 
every area of competition law, but fundamental changes are still necessary. 
One important change that should be made concerns the adoption of a 
balancing consideration of competition restraints and efficiency. In addition, 
the market power standard should be adopted to demarcate the coverage of 
the unfair trade practices clause. 
Development of competition law principles requires a high degree of 
intellectual capacity, and therefore the professional capacity of JFTC 
personnel must be improved. With its increased legal power and favorable 
political environment, the JFTC’s performance depends on the intellectual 
capacity of each commissioner and Secretariat personnel now more than 
ever. The necessity of their upgrading has reached a zenith and it is important 
that Japan respond appropriately and promptly. 
Japan also should abolish the traditional appointment system by which 
former ministry directors-general receive appointments to become JFTC 
commissioners. In their place should go extremely proficient economists and 
lawyers who understand the dynamics inherent in the practical application of 
competition law. Adding regulatory reform to the powers of the JFTC and 
renaming the JFTC to an appropriately titled agency such as the 
“Competition Commission” should attract more capable personnel. 
The introduction of private enforcement (primarily private injunctive 
relief) possesses the potential to significantly strengthen enforcement of the 
Antimonopoly Law by enlarging initiators of lawsuits under the 
Antimonopoly Law. The ongoing reform of the judicial system in Japan will 
transform Japanese society into one that is more rule oriented, one in which 
competition law and policy will play central roles. 
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